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Successful Alliance Establishment and Evolution in a Volatile 
Business Environment: the Case of “Cellars of Canterbury” 
Lance D. Oliver and Hamish R. Gow 
 
Introduction 
The reason some alliances can withstand unforeseen environmental shifts and evolve 
while others fail is an intriguing issue.  Many have identified critical properties of 
alliances that have been able to make such transitions.  However, little attention has been 
given to the process of development that leads to these flexible alliance relationships.  
We believe that the problem stems from the contractual rigidity imposed by partners in 
the initial stages to the formation of an alliance.  This paper analyzes a process to create 
self-enforcing agreements that lead to a flexible alliance architecture capable of 
reconfiguration to meet the demands of environmental change.  Using an empirical case 
study of “Cellars of Canterbury” a New Zealand wine producing and marketing joint 
venture, we suggest that immediate value creation establishes private enforcement capital 
in a relationship which allows for critical relation-specific investment to take place 
without the need for written contractual safeguards.  We also emphasize the advantage of 
external contract enforcement mechanisms and third party verification in reinforcing 
these relationships.  We then argue that it is this lack of contractual rigidity that allows an 
alliance agreement to be reconfigured when environmental circumstances change.    3 
Research Trends 
Existing strategic alliance research is endowed with numerous studies that investigate the 
factors critical to successful formation, or alternatively, those that lead to alliance 
dysfunction (Yan, 1998).  However, little attention has been given to the area of alliance 
evolution (Inkpen, 2001).  In other words, the questions of “how” as opposed to those of 
“what”. 
Recent and notable contributions to the subject of alliance evolution include that of Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994) who developed a process framework of the developmental 
processes in alliances that cannot be fully specified or controlled by the parties ex-ante 
execution.  Following on from this, Doz (1996) explored the evolution of cooperation, 
suggesting that alliance evolution occurs through a process of learning, reevaluation, and 
readjustment cycles and focused on the conditions fostering or blocking inter-partner 
learning in alliances.  Gulati (1998) approached evolution from a social networks 
perspective and examined the influence of structural and social embeddedness on alliance 
longevity.  Child and Faulkner (1998) considered the evolution of trust based 
relationships and suggested that trust develops gradually overtime as partners encounter 
particular stages in the alliance.  Arino and de la Torre (1998) examined the evolutionary 
interaction between two partners in a failed alliance.  However, as yet there has not been 
an investigation of how to establish an alliance that can successfully evolve overtime in 
accordance with shifts in the external environment (Gulati, 1998).  This paper focuses on 
expanding both our conceptual and empirical understanding of how alliances evolve over 
time.    4 
Governance of Alliances 
Within its definition, the term strategic alliance can take on a broad range of inter-
organizational forms.  However, it is generally understood that the purpose of a strategic 
alliance is the pooling of resources in a synergistic manner to enable value creation that 
would not be achievable by acting alone (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998; Inkpen, 2001).  As such the alliance relationship is not just a mechanism 
of governance but a productive resource for value creation (Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  
An effective alliance relationship also provides its partners with a degree of strategic 
flexibility suitable for operating under uncertain environmental conditions (Mjoen and 
Tallman, 1997).  However, to realize the potential synergistic combinations of resources 
and appropriate the expected knowledge or economic outcomes from these relationships 
often requires significant relationship or transaction specific investment (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  The failure of partners to recognize the extent 
of this investment is a common reason for alliance failure (Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  
Kumar and Nti (1998) theorize that such under-investment in relationship or transaction 
specific investment at establishment causes negative outcome discrepancies and it is the 
firms’ reactions to such discrepancies that decide the longevity of the alliance.   
It is clear that investment in relationship specific assets, often ‘soft’ relational assets 
(Kumar and Nti, 1998), must be made by the partnering firms if the alliance is to be 
successful.  However, as numerous authors recognize, investment in relationship specific 
assets early in an alliance’s lifecycle exposes the firms involved to the threat of 
opportunistic behavior from each other (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 
1985; Reich and Mankin, 1986; Kogut, 1988, 1989; Doz et al., 1989; Barney and Hansen,   5 
1994; Gulati, 1995).  This vulnerability to opportunistic behavior often leads partners to 
create safeguards between one another (Williamson, 1985).  Since, as Williamson (1985) 
purports, when the appropriate safeguards are in place, partners become more willing to 
make the necessary relation-specific investments
1, which will generally lead to the 
generation of greater relational rents
2.   
It seems that the most appropriate solution to these concerns of opportunistic behavior is 
to construct stringent contractual agreements between alliance partners that address the 
matters.  However, although these contractual mechanisms may be viable in very stable 
business environments, they are often found to be inappropriate solutions in volatile, 
uncertain environments prone to unforeseen shifts and changes (Klein, 1996; Gow et al., 
2000).  Problems arise, as it is costly, if not impossible, to stipulate pre-specified 
contractual terms to cover all possible future states of nature, hence, formal contract 
mechanisms are inherently incomplete (Klein, 1996).  Thus, recognizing that contracts 
are naturally incomplete, if market conditions change substantially from those initially 
envisioned, the creation of a legally binding agreement, enforceable by either party, may 
in fact support further opportunistic behavior to occur rather than removing it, one party 
may be able to enforce the rigid literal terms of the contract to adversely affect other 
parties, even when these terms are contrary to the initial implicit intent of the contracting 
parties (Klein, 1996, Gow et al., 2000).  This is generally referred to as a hold-up 
problem. 
                                                 
1 We define relationship-specific investments to include time, effort, knowledge as well as the physical 
assets directly relating to the relationship.  
2 Relational rent, as defined by Dyer and Singh (1998) is a supernormal profit jointly generated in an 
exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through 
the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners. 
 
   6 
Trust and Private Enforcement 
The widely reported solution to this dilemma is to base these types of inter-organizational 
relationships on trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Gulati, 
1995; Doz, 1996; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Carney, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
However, trust has wide and varying connotations (Gulati, 1995) and there is not a 
unifying definition (Inkpen and Currall, 1997).  Some distinguish between knowledge 
based trust - that developed through ongoing interaction and built around the norms of 
equity; and deterrence based trust - the threat that untrustworthy behavior will result in 
costly sanctions that exceed any potential benefits of opportunism (Gulati, 1995).  
Bradach and Eccles (1989) define trust as the expectation that alleviates the fear that a 
partner to exchange will act opportunistically.  Chiles and McMackin (1996) suggest that 
the social norms of reciprocity, obligation, cooperation, and fairness generate trust.  
Barney and Hansen (1994) on the other hand give a three-fold definition of the level of 
trust that will be exhibited between business partners based on the circumstances of the 
relationship.  Further, mechanisms reported as having the ability to create trust include 
repeated transactions (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999), making equity investments to signal ones intention to their partner (Gulati, 
Khanna, Nohria, 1994), or alternatively, making requisite equity investments to create a 
mutual hostage between partners (Williamson, 1975, 1983; Gulati, 1995). 
We believe that a more comprehensive and workable definition of trust can be found in 
what Klein (1996) terms, private enforcement capital (PEC).  PEC consists of a 
combination of privately enforceable sanctions that influence the partners to a transaction 
to abide by the agreement they have made (Klein, 1996).  These sanctions have two parts,   7 
one being the loss of the discounted present value of all future relational rents accruing to 
non-salvageable relationship-specific investments (Klein, 1996).  The other is the loss of 
the transactor’s reputation in the market place (Klein, 1996).  This includes the potential 
exclusion from further transactions with the current party to contract, plus, either 
exclusion from, or increased costs of doing business with other transactors in the market 
place (Klein, 1996, Gow et al., 2000).  This increased cost is the result of future 
transacting parties imposing more explicit and/or unfavorable terms of contract on the 
opportunistically behaving party (Klein, 1996, Gow et al., 2000).  At any point in time, 
partners to a transaction balance the costs of behaving opportunistically against the 
benefits to be gained from opportunism (Klein, 1996, Gow et al., 2000).  If the gains 
from opportunism are greater than the PEC that exists between the partners then a breach 
of the agreement will occur (Klein, 1996, Gow et al., 2000).  In one way or another, this 
framework effectively encompasses all of the definitions of trust previously provided.  
Trust therefore is a function of relational rents and reputation and can be considered 
synonymous with private enforcement capital.  
The magnitude of PEC between partners to an alliance defines the range over which an 
agreement will be self-enforcing.  If circumstances in the external environment change 
sufficiently to cause the cost/benefit ratio of a breach in the agreement to shift outside 
this range then a breach will occur (Gow et al., 2000).  Outside of this range contacts 
must be enforced via external mechanisms.  The solution that Klein (1996) advocates is 
that in any agreement that carries a risk of significant loss should either partner engage in 
opportunism, transactors should use written contractual terms to bring the agreement 
close to the desired performance level and then rely on PEC to force performance the   8 
remainder of the way.  The existence of PEC between partners, and therefore a self-
enforcing range, means that actors will perform in a manner consistent with the mutually 
understood implicit contractual intent even when not all elements of the contractual 
understanding are pre-specified in the written contract (Klein, 1996).  The fact that more 
explicit contractual terms create greater rigidity (Klein, 1996) also means that the 
presence of PEC allows for a greater degree of flexibility within a relationship without 
the fear of opportunistic behavior.  Such flexibility enhances the ability of transactors to 
adjust and renegotiate their agreement to meet changes and shifts in the underlying 
external environment.   
Alternative External Enforcement 
During the establishment of an alliance in a highly volatile environment, or an 
environment where legal enforcement is weak or absent, it is difficult for parties to use 
strict written contractual terms to bring and hold themselves together.  Under such 
circumstances Gow and Swinnen (2001) advocate the use of alternative external 
enforcement mechanisms and institutional structures.  Third parties can be used in such a 
way to provide verification of performance or to adjudicate in matters of arbitration.  In 
reference to strategic alliances, these third parties can form what Dyer et al. (2001) term, 
the “strategic alliance function”.  The role of an alliance function is to improve 
knowledge management, increase external visibility, provide internal coordination, and 
eliminate accountability and intervention problems (Dyer et al., 2001).  
Thus, the key to establishing a successful alliance relationship with the durability to 
subsist in a volatile market environment is to establish the agreement such that a   9 
sufficiently large self-enforcing range exists, or can be developed, that encourages the 
optimal level of investment to take place without constructing written contractual terms 
that may create the potential for opportunistic behavior and impose undue rigidity on the 
relationship.  As has been illustrated, to form a self-enforcing agreement a degree of PEC 
must exist between partners.  In an initial alliance between unknown partners, there is 
little or no PEC present.  At establishment little multilateral reputation exists between 
alliance partners.  They have their reputation in the market place to protect, however, this 
assumes an element of market transparency and if absent or constrained in some way, 
then reputation alone will not create a sufficient level of PEC.  Therefore, rents must be 
generated by the alliance to create PEC.  Given the difficulty of attracting investment 
from the partners in the absence of PEC, this must be done without requiring a large 
expense by the alliance partners.  
Generating Private Enforcement Capital 
Prahalad’s (1993) theory of value creation provides an insight as to how this is possible.  
According to Prahalad (1993) value creating activity can be viewed as having two 
aspects: the performance gap - optimizing performance through operating efficiencies - 
and the opportunity gap - exploiting opportunities for new product, market, or business 
development (Prahalad, 1993).  Thus, a concentration on managing the performance gap 
does not require large investments of capital but if done well can return immediate profits 
(Prahalad, 1993) and consequently, create private enforcement capital between the 
alliance partners.  Overtime and as [perhaps successive] performance gap issues are 
worked through, the foreseeable scope and opportunities for the alliance become clearer 
and as such multilateral reputation among its partners becomes important.  Such   10 
reputation adds additional PEC to the relationship until the accumulation is such that it 
extends the self enforcing range of the alliance to where the partners feel comfortable 
pursuing opportunity gap activities, that is, investing in relation-specific assets, engaging 
in business activities with more uncertain returns, and generally accepting a greater risk 
of opportunism.  It is these initial incremental transactions that Doz (1996, 77) refers to 
as the “early ‘small’ events in an alliance [that] have a disproportionate importance in 
establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of heightened efficiency expectations, greater 
institutional and personal trust and commitment, joint sense-making and learning, and 
greater flexibility and adaptability”. 
Case Study: Cellars of Canterbury 
‘Cellars of Canterbury’ is a wine producing and marketing joint venture between five 
independent New Zealand (NZ) wineries.  The alliance was initially established in 1996 
as a mechanism to save promotional costs.  In the six years ensuing its establishment the 
alliance has underwent several structural changes in response to changes in its operating 
environment and now controls the complete production and supply of its own label of 
wine into the two largest export markets for wine in the world, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and United States of America (US).  Data for the case study was collected in December 
2000 through a series of semi-structured interviews with the ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ 
owners, staff, and business partners. 
In 1996, the NZ trade development board put a program in place designed to encourage 
the formation of business networks between individual enterprises.  The rationale for this 
was that if businesses were prepared to cooperate they could compete more successfully   11 
in the international market place.  The government funded scheme offered to provide the 
services of a business consultant and significantly subsidize the establishment costs of 
these hard business networks (HBN), as they were termed.  
A member of what is now the ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ joint venture was made aware of 
this scheme and immediately saw the opportunity to implement an initiative he had been 
contemplating for sometime.  His vision, was to form an alliance between a group of 
wineries from the same geographical region and share the expenses of entering the NZ 
wine trade fairs, the most widely recognized promotional event for NZ wineries.  He and 
the newly appointed business consultant approached what they felt were the four most 
attractive potential business partners with this concept.  They were all virtual strangers 
but some of the more high profile and innovative vintners in the Canterbury
3 region.  All 
could see that there were significant benefits to be realized if they were prepared to 
cooperate and accepted the invitation to join the alliance. 
They registered the name “Cellars of Canterbury” as a limited liability company.  The 
initial strategic intent of the alliance was to collectively raise the profile of Canterbury as 
a wine producing region and save costs in the process.  The strategy they followed was to 
enter the regional NZ wine fairs under a collective “Cellars of Canterbury” banner.  They 
would place one entry but put their whole range of wines on the stand and share the 
attendance duties among the partners, thereby spreading the fixed costs of entry, time, 
and travel.  This was a performance gap they were exploiting and by entering the 
alliance, the partners were presented with an immediate value gain.  These relational 
                                                 
3 Canterbury is a province of the South Island of New Zealand.   12 
rents were generated with very low investment and therefore created immediate private 
enforcement capital between the partners. 
Concurrently, external enforcement mechanisms were developed.  The business 
consultant formalized the agreement by writing a constitution for the newly formed 
company which specified guidelines for business conduct and protocols.  Most 
importantly, this included provisions for exit and entry of partners from the alliance.  The 
consultant also acted as a means of third party verification of performance levels and 
compliance to the agreement.  He facilitated information flow between the partners acting 
as a mediator in discussions and an arbitrator in disputes.  This information flow and 
personal interaction was based around regular bi-monthly directors meeting which only 
the directors could attend, they each held equivocal voting rights so the power of decision 
making and control was effectively positioned to allow maximum responsiveness.  This 
was also important since it meant that the same individuals were interacting at the 
interface of the alliance which aided to develop and reinforce the importance of 
multilateral reputation.  In effect the consultant represented the “alliance function”.  All 
of these factors provided further enforcement to help solidify the relationship and guide it 
through the initial uneasy stages of establishment until sufficient internal enforcement 
existed.  The significance of the government assistance cannot be understated since this 
made putting these provisions in place costless and therefore did not deduct from the 
present value of the relational rents earned.  
‘Cellars’ hired the services of a reputable wine-maker as a wine consultant to accompany 
them on monthly tours of each others vineyard and winery to assess and advise on grape 
quality and viticultural procedure.  This helped to ensure a high quality product, provided   13 
transparency, gave the partners a degree of process control over the product, and 
represented another form of third party verification, thus, preventing free-riding.  These 
regular engagements stimulated social interaction between the alliance partners which 
developed further multilateral reputation between them all and led to increased vision of 
the potential scope for the alliance.  During these semi-formal proceedings many side 
transactions took place, partners arranged to share facilities, trade produce, and share the 
expense of capital equipment purchases which all acted to further strengthen the 
relationship by increasing PEC.  
These early incremental transactions were the “small events” that Doz (1996) refers to, 
and all contributed to creating PEC among the alliance partners.  The initial performance 
gap, cost saving strategy, produced immediate value and as such created PEC, the 
continual personal interaction and increasing vision of the alliance’s potential developed 
multilateral reputation between the business partners, thus creating additional PEC, and 
the external enforcement mechanisms that were put in place acted to further extend the 
self-enforcing range of the agreement.  All of this took place before any significant 
capital investments and therefore contractual safeguards were required and thus, the 
alliance relationship was established with minimal contractual rigidity.  
The first opportunity they saw to advance the alliance was to use it to increase their 
presence in the local Christchurch
4 City market.  ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ employed a 
salesperson whose role was to place the member’s wines onto the wine-lists of as many 
licensed restaurants in Christchurch City as possible.  This spelt the first significant 
relation-specific financial investment for the alliance.  They were now financing the sale 
                                                 
4 Christchurch is the largest city of the Canterbury province, third largest in NZ.   14 
of product on behalf of each other, as opposed to only promoting it, as they had done in 
the past.  The fact that they felt comfortable investing this additional capital and 
resources and modifying the initial agreement is evidence of the level of PEC that had 
accumulated in the relationship and its flexible nature.  At the same time their business 
consultant had developed some small export trade relationships in the pacific islands. 
These were not ideal markets and were not the primary focus of the ‘Cellars’ partners 
themselves but served as a means to fill the export trade requirement of the government 
assistance they received and also provided valuable export trading experience for those 
partners that had not done so previously.  The small distributors they dealt with found 
‘Cellars’ an attractive prospect since by dealing with one supplier they were presented 
with a multitude of wines. ‘Cellars’ charged a sales commission on top of the wineries’ 
retail prices so in effect it was more expensive than dealing with the wineries directly.  
The local market strategy was a success but there was an ever increasing demand for 
Marlborough
5 Sauvignon Blanc which by then had gained profound recognition both 
domestically and internationally
6.  In order to maintain there current market position the 
wineries would have to make Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc a part of their offering.  
Contracting for grapes or buying from the spot market was not a satisfactory option from 
a long-term perspective.  The importance of grape quality for the purpose of wine-making 
cannot be overstated.  To assure quality at an affordable price they required vineyard 
ownership.  When it appeared that this was the direction the joint venture was headed, 
                                                 
5 Marlborough is a province in the Northern part of the South Island of NZ. It is the largest grape growing 
region in NZ, most recognized for its Sauvignon Blanc. 
6 NZ has won the Silverado trophy for the best Sauvignon Blanc at one of the worlds most prominent wine 
contests – The International Wine and Spirit competition – 9 times since it was first established 11 years 
ago.   
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one of the partners became uncomfortable.  The winery he represented did not have the 
desire nor the financial standing to push the alliance to this next level.   
Some of the wineries already had small holdings in Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc 
vineyards but could not afford to extend themselves further privately.  ‘Cellars’ provided 
another avenue toward vineyard ownership, but it would require a change of personnel.  
This did not pose a problem since they had a formula for exit in place and were not bound 
by any other contractual rigidity.  There were many interested parties waiting to join the 
alliance given the opportunity, this was a clear indication of the industry reputation that 
had accumulated to the ‘Cellars’ entity.  They evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of 
the alliance as it stood, the markets they were operating in, the intended strategic 
direction they had for the company, and chose a new partner with the complimentary core 
competencies they required.  The owner/director of this new partner winery was also 
managing director of a large Australian commodity trading company and possessed a 
wealth of experience in international business and export trading.  
Late in 1998, almost immediately after restructuring the alliance they purchased a large 
vineyard holding in the Marlborough region.  Operating through the joint venture allowed 
for this purchase to made using 100 percent debt financing.  The land purchase signified a 
large relation-specific asset investment and spelt a major structural and operating change 
for ‘Cellars of Canterbury’.  However, a large stock of PEC had amassed in the alliance 
to nullify any threat of opportunism.  ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ was providing significant 
returns to the partners and opportunities not available to their individual enterprises.  
They had become well known in the domestic marketplace, hence market reputation was 
also providing significant PEC.  In addition, external enforcement mechanisms in the   16 
form of an exit strategy, the legal rights to land ownership, and the fact that they held 
equal authority and control in the company provided powerful incentives.  Internal 
enforcement capital had reached a level where the company felt they could manage 
without the third party enforcement provided by the business consultant.  At this point in 
time they took over the administrative duties of the company and established their own 
private office.  They kept this independent of any of the five wineries’ private offices and 
employed an independent office clerk, this way the authority and control in the company 
remained balanced. 
Domestic competition had heightened in NZ, the number of suppliers was increasing 
rapidly (the number of wineries increased 173% between 1990 and 2000), wine 
consumption had stabilized, and it appeared that the situation would only worsen owing 
to the fact that a large acreage of vineyard planting and development had taken place 
throughout NZ that was yet to come on stream.  The largest outlets for NZ wine were 
very cost/price oriented and large volumes were required to compete in this market arena. 
These were the principle forces that convinced ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ to refocus its 
direction and embark on a strategy of International promotion.  Initially they 
implemented the same strategy as they had in the domestic NZ market, they entered the 
high profile European wine trade shows as ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ but touted the wines 
of each of its members on the stand.  From here they aligned themselves with distribution 
agents predominantly in the UK which amounted to varying levels of success among the 
partners.  
The problem was they were not exploiting the comparative advantage that ‘Cellars’ 
endowed them.  The decision was made to advance the ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ concept a   17 
step further and produce a “Cellars of Canterbury” labeled range of wines.  Among other 
advantages this provided a means of raising capital for debt repayment without requiring 
a direct input from the partners.  Another benefit was the opportunity to add value to 
surplus fruit from the individuals’ wineries by selling this directly to ‘Cellars’ rather than 
a third party.  It also allowed them to replace their domestic salesperson with a specialist 
International marketing agent, whose task was to seek markets and distribution channels 
in the UK and US specifically for the generic label.  Beside the obvious PEC contained in 
the relationship that such a development depicts, of most interest is how the flexible links 
between the components in their supply chain architecture allowed ‘Cellars’ to 
reconfigure there domestic supply chain to create an international supply chain to meet 
the unique market opportunities that confronted them.  The marketing agent aligned them 
with one of the largest wine importers into the UK and an extensive distribution channel 
in the US.  Owing to a number of factors, the position ‘Cellars’ has taken in these two 
markets would not have been possible individually.  Acting through the joint venture 
reduced the individual capital requirement, spread the risk bearing, and provided them the 
volume of product required to fulfill a significant export market.  
Conclusion 
We believe a lot can be learned from this case about the process to establishing alliances 
that can successfully evolve in volatile business environments.  By implementing a 
strategy aimed at a performance gap issue ‘Cellars of Canterbury’ was able to create 
immediate value in the relationship with little expense.  This led to private enforcement 
capital amassing in the relationship which negated the need for written contractual 
safeguards when relation-specific asset investment took place.  As the potential scope for   18 
the alliance became visible multilateral reputation became important and thus increased 
the private enforcement capital between the partners further.  In this sense a type of self-
reinforcing cycle developed, where generation of rents created private enforcement 
capital which increased the importance of reputation, adding additional private 
enforcement capital.  The strengthened relationship allowed for entry into further market 
opportunities creating greater rents and so the cycle repeats.  
The fact that the alliance was based upon self-enforcing agreements meant that the 
company was not bound by stringent contractual rigidities and could make necessary 
changes to the structure and operation of the joint venture when environmental forces 
commanded.  In addition, having a consultant guide the establishment of the alliance 
provided an important external enforcement mechanism that acted to reinforce the 
alliance agreement until sufficient internal enforcement capital existed. 
Discussion 
The research reported here draws on a single case, thus, as always, one must treat the 
findings and propositions drawn with a degree of caution.  However, we believe that this 
case provides some interesting insights into the process of developing successful flexible 
alliance relationships.  A question that immediately comes to mind is would these 
findings hold in a corporate setting where there is perhaps a much less personal interface 
in alliance relationships.  
A policy issue arising from this study is that of the role of central government in funding 
the establishment of such Hard Business Networks.  As was noted in the case, 
government funding made the initial facilitation and external enforcement of the alliance   19 
relationship costless, therefore, it did not detract from the initial relational rents generated 
and thus allowed for a higher level of private enforcement capital to amass from these 
rents.   20 
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